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Abstract
Abdurrahman Wahid was appointed by MPR (the Indonesian People’s Representative Assembly) 
as the President of the Republic of Indonesia because of his idea of democracy, convincing the 
prevailing two opposing groups, namely the nationalist groups and Islamist groups (it is well-
known as Poros Tengah/ the Central Axis). Indeed, he was able to adapt democracy to the Islamic 
tradition by employing the fiqh-plus paradigm to the relationship between Islam and the state. He 
made uses of the presidential office to consolidate the democratic transition such as by supporting 
civil society, establishing civil supremacy and establishing law enforcement. From beginning it was 
not easy for him to socialise his fiqh-plus paradigm to other Islamic groups. Moreover, Central 
Axis, the determining force contributing to the win of Wahid’s presidential election, felt upset with 
Wahid’s policies which did not align with their interests. The nationalist groups were also anxious 
about occupying the presidential office for themself. Last but not the least, the military also 
agreed with the idea of impeachment of President Wahid in order to save their political interests. 
Keywords: Abdurrahman Wahid, president, fiqh paradigm, democracy, central axis. 
A. Introduction
Abdurrahman Wahid’s achievement of being 
president was due to his track record as well 
as people’s perception of him being a capable 
figure for mediating conflicting ideas between 
the supporters of the secular and the Islamic 
paradigms in post-Soeharto era. Indeed, Wahid 
was a politician as he tried to create opinion, 
especially about the relationship between Islam 
and state, which would influence the public, 
but at first he did not engage with the formal 
political system. In 1987 he became the member 
of Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (the 
Indonesian People’s Representative Assembly) 
to represent Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) where he 
was general leader of NU, but it was only a short 
while for him in MPR as he considered that he 
had done his job as member of MPR. Then, he 
became more critical of the Soeharto regime 
and, in fact, his political influence as the leader 
of NU was greater that of the leaders of political 
parties (Rochmat, 2003) because he was able to 
provide a counter discourse to the monolithic 
interpretation of Pancasila by the Soeharto 
regime in 1990s. This was due to his capabilities 
in employing democracy as a tool for criticizing 
the regime (Schwarz, 1994: 188-200). 
What directed Wahid to play such political role 
was his religious paradigm that religion, namely 
Islam, as a source of values should direct the 
course of societal life. However, he did not 
consider that Islam and politic are identical. 
Accordingly, he does not agree with the Islamists 
who develop a legal formal approach that the 
state is to implement an Islamic law (Shari’a) 
or at least to interpret Pancasila by an Islamic 
law (Shari’a). In this regard, Wahid develops a 
political approach within the context of the Fiqh 
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paradigm that Islam and the state should develop 
mutual legitimacy by means of democracy. In 
so doing, Muslims would support the national 
political system as well as would be critical of 
autocratic regimes (Wahid, 1999a: 53-54). 
Wahid’s ultimate thought was democracy such 
as manifest in his inauguration of president on 
20 October 1999. At that time he gave a speech 
entitled ‘Membangun Demokrasi Bukan Tugas 
yang Ringan’ [Establish Democracy is not an 
Easy Job] (Abdurrahman Wahid, 1999b: 107-
111). He believed that democracy is the key 
for the development of freedom of speech, the 
equality by the law, and law enforcement, which, 
then, direct towards the establishment of justice 
and welfare (Abdurrahman Wahid, 1999b: 100-
110). Based on his presidential inauguration 
speech, I would like to discuss his efforts at 
consolidating democracy in Indonesia which 
extended until his removal from presidential 
office. I would like to highlight some issues 
that are curbing the influence of Islam politics, 
creating a civil supremacy in government, 
fostering law enforcement, and supporting the 
establishment of a strong civil society. 
B. Method
This research uses historical method that follows 
the procedure of heuristic, resources critics, 
interpretation, and historiography. The first step, 
heuristic, I collect the data and information 
related to the Abdurrahman Wahid in order to 
find some facts. The next step, I verify the facts 
in order to know the validity of their contents. At 
the third step I try to find the relationship amongst 
the facts as well as to know their meanings. This 
study poses primary research question how 
Abdurrahman Wahid consolidate the transition 
of democracy at post Soeharto era based on the 
Fiqh paradigm.
C. Result and Discussion
It is very often to confuse fiqh with Shari’ah as 
both mean Islamic religious law, but both are 
quite different. Fiqh is defined as the clerics’ 
understanding or interpretation of Shari’ah, 
meanwhile Shari’ah is an Islamic religious 
law as such, so that fiqh implies a pluralistic 
character of Islamic religious law. Conversely, 
Shari’ah is often claimed by the Islamists as 
meaning monolithic Islamic religious law. 
The traditionalist Muslims believe that Fiqh 
governs the Muslims on their daily life and 
accordingly represents the Islamic world view 
which intertwines between secular and religious 
matters. A fiqh approach implies a socio-cultural 
approach as it tries to synthesise between ‘the 
normative’ of religion and ‘particular’ of culture 
such as Indonesian culture. In line with this 
Wahid supported the existence of the Republic of 
Indonesia with its national ideology of Pancasila. 
In this regard he did not agree with the idea of the 
legal formal Shari’ah as he advocated the idea of 
the substantial Shari’ah focusing on the universal 
Islamic values. In other words, he did not agree 
with Islamic ideological paradigm obsessed with 
the ideas of an Islamic state or of interpreting 
Pancasila with the Shari’ah. By so doing, Wahid 
tried to consolidate democracy in pursuit to a 
modern nation state. Through out this article 
you will find that Wahid confronted with some 
supporters of an Islamic ideological paradigm. 
 
C.1. Abdurrahman Wahid’s Presidential 
Candidacy and His Idea of Avoiding Violence
The late period of the reign of Soeharto, especially 
upon the coming of the general election in 1997, 
was a time of the most widespread violence in 
the history of Soeharto’s era. Vertical conflict 
between people and the government apparatus 
increased dramatically as President Soeharto 
was willing to see the election run successfully, 
in terms of the absolute win of Golkar, which 
served for his political legitimacy. For that 
purpose, the government apparatus often 
employed intimidation methods and as a result, 
the general election was not useful for absorbing 
the socio-political aspirations of the people. 
Moreover, the government tried to plug the 
political channels such as political parties, mass 
media, and mass organisations for the purpose of 
political stability. However, this did not create 
political stability when it encountered a financial 
crisis starting in July 1997 and it, then, developed 
into a multi-sector crisis which triggered social 
chaos. Accordingly, the foreign investors 
withdrew their capital for Indonesia and some 
Chinese ethnic entrepreneurs moved their money 
to foreign countries so that the crisis worsened. 
In this regard, the student demonstrations spread 
in some big cities demanding for Soeharto to 
step down as his economic legitimacy was no 
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longer valid. The military hesitated to crush 
the massive demonstrations because of internal 
fragmentation as well as international pressure 
for violating human rights. Soeharto tried 
to moderate the demand by promising some 
political reformation, but no one supported 
his government so that Soeharto returned its 
mandate to MPR and accordingly, B.J. Habibie 
was in charge as the president. 
This period was called the Reformation era and 
Habibie popularized the concept of Masyarakat 
Madani, a concept comparable to civil society. 
For that purpose, he issued Presidential decree 
Number 198 in 27 February 1999 as the basis for 
the forming a team which would formulate and 
socialise the concept of Masyarakat Madani. This 
concept was to replace the Soeharto paradigm of 
political stability. By so doing, President Habibie 
tried to attract the popular support of the people 
for his presidential candidacy in the next general 
election. In this regard, he had strong support 
from ICMI as well as some Islamists, such as 
those who associated with DDII, which upheld 
the idea of an Islamic state. This concept of 
masyarakat madani was ICMI’s understanding 
of the concept of civil society which was slightly 
different from its original ideas about this. In 
this way, President Habibie tried to obtain the 
support of the Muslims as well as to promote 
the establishment of a good government (Saefur 
Rochmat, 2003).
President B.J. Habibie did not have strong 
legitimacy to make any drastic political changes 
as he was not elected through general election. His 
government was a transitional one with the task 
of preparing and holding a general election. In 
this transitional period tension appeared amongst 
different socio-political groups competing for 
the control of power. This also related to the 
interpretation of Pancasila whose status as an 
open ideology was multi-interpretable. There 
were at least three paradigms competing with 
each other for control of the power. It was not 
surprising that there appeared no less than 100 
political parties, of which 48 competed in the 
general election. 
There were very significant political parties 
based on Islamic ideology so that Gus Dur 
was compelled to establish a political party 
which would counter Islamic ideology in the 
Parliament. On 23 July 1998 Gus Dur facilitated 
the establishment of PKB (Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa) with the aim of guarding the existence 
of the Republic of Indonesia based on its original 
modus vivendi of the founding fathers (Mahfudz 
MD, 2010: 107-08). Wahid noticed that there 
were three types of Muslim response to the issue 
of Islam and the state, which were: integration, 
facultative, and confrontation. Wahid advocated 
the first type in which Islam leaves its formal 
relationship with the state. When people become 
good Muslims it is not because of the state, 
but because of their cultural and educational 
backgrounds. The Muslim modernists advocated 
the second type as they were willingly to create 
Islamic regulations if they had enough power in 
the parliament. Meanwhile the fundamentalist 
Muslims opposed any “un-Islamic concepts” 
such as the secular nation state (Abdurrahman 
Wahid, 1998: 23). Responding to the coming 
Indonesian Muslim Congress in 1998, Wahid 
was pessimistic about any positive result given 
the naive statement of its organizers that the 
Muslims should set aside their differences for the 
common objective of praising God. This implied 
that they did not tolerate different manifestations 
of Islam and their Islamic missionaries were still 
at the state of the establishment of the faith, not 
yet handling the problems of human beings in the 
modern era (Abdurrahman Wahid, 1998: 20-21).
Upon the general election there arose some 
violence in some NU based areas which Wahid 
considered as the way to neutralize the political 
influence of the NU followers and he noticed 
the involvement of some military actors with 
personal political interest (Abdurrahman Wahid, 
1997b: 72-74). To respond to this unconducive 
situation, Wahid wrote an article titled “Dimensi 
Kehalusan Budi dan Rasa (The dimension of the 
true heart and the true feeling).” (Abdurrahman 
Wahid, 1997a: 79-82). This article focuses on the 
important role of the heart which would create 
meaningful human beings, namely in the form of 
living in harmony. This article was to criticize 
those who value highly the role of ideologies 
and who, accordingly, consider life based on 
the formal truth of ideologies. As a result, life 
was full of conflicts. In the view of ideology, life 
would be full of regulations and just based on 
mathematical calculation, which would cause a 
deficit in the meaning of life. This kind of thought 
tended to value highly the role of reason for 
solving the problems of human beings. In fact, 
102
Saefur Rochmat :
President Abdurrahman Wahid’s Efforts to Consolidate ...
some modern sciences and technologies are not 
able to handle all the problems of human beings 
and very often, they have a negative impact on 
society. Accordingly, people should take into 
their consideration the principle of harmony 
without which life would be unbalanced as it 
ignores the true heart (Abdurrahman Wahid, 
1997a). For Wahid, life was not only directed by 
the certainty of the formal ideological truth: in 
fact, there are some aspects of human life which 
should be taken into consideration such as the 
feeling of uncertainty and of emptiness which 
would sharpen human beings’ sense of feeling. 
This would direct people to the consciousness of 
God, the only certain and absolute (Abdurrahman 
Wahid, 1997a). This writing implies that all 
ideologies should develop the principle of 
mutual give and take for their relevancy in 
the contemporary era to solve the problems of 
human beings.
Islamic parties lost in the general election on 7 
June 1999 and none of them passed the electoral 
threshold, except PPP, the old party which 
campaigned on the basis of Shari’a (Suhelmi, 
1999: 122). Furthermore, electoral gain of 
Islamic parties as well as Muslim based parties, 
namely PKB and PAN, was less that than that of 
their voice in the general election of 1955. This 
implies that the political dichotomy between 
the secular paradigm and the Islamic paradigm 
had subsided so some Muslim leaders were also 
represented in the secular parties, especially 
Golkar. Accordingly, it was not relevant to assume 
that the role of Islamic leaders had decreased as 
they were able to manoeuvre to challenge the 
candidacy of Megawati as president from PDI-P 
the first rank in the general election. 
Based on the principle of the state of balancing 
(Abdurrahman Wahid, 2004: vii-x), Wahid felt 
free to accept the offer of presidential candidacy 
by the coalition of Muslim parties called the 
Centre Axis because it enabled him to take the 
role of mediating the conflicting interests of 
the secular nationalists and those of Muslim 
nationalists. In line with this, PKB, the political 
wing of NU under the auspices of Wahid’s 
leadership, formally proposed Wahid as the 
candidate for president. It looked like Wahid 
acted undemocratically as he did not support 
the right of Megawati of PDIP as the winner 
of the first general election in 1999 in the post-
Soeharto regime. Personally, Wahid supported 
the right of Megawati to be the next Indonesian 
president in the next general assembly of MPR, 
but she did not make enough efforts to convince 
Islamic parties that she would pursue policies 
in favour of Muslim interests. Indeed, PDIP 
had significant support from non-Muslim and 
the secular Muslims, but it was not true to state 
that PDIP did not pay attention to the interest of 
Muslims as some of its legislatures were devoted 
Muslims. I can understand the worry of Islamic 
parties that Megawati as the general leader of 
PDIP would not make any political deal with 
them related to the governmental affairs. It was 
common in the Indonesian presidential system 
to accommodate the representatives of quite 
significantly different socio-political groups to 
run the country. Moreover, these political parties 
were worried about the ability of Megawati to 
solve the issues of Muslim affairs as she did not 
develop good communication with some Islamic 
groups. 
Wahid evaluated that the general election just 
provided an instrumental tool for establishing 
democracy, such as: to make radical changes to 
some regulations about operational mechanisms 
for running government; to regulate properly 
the relationship as well as the authority of 
central government and provincial and local 
governments; to create professional military 
apparatus; and to arrange some governmental 
institutions in order to run effectively (Iskandar, 
2004: 3-4). However, it did not guarantee to 
avoid any outbreak of violence in the society. 
In the case of the 1999 general election, it did 
not result in the majority win of PDIP and 
accordingly, PDIP had to share power with 
other parties. Moreover, this general election 
was only to choose representatives of people 
from political parties; meanwhile MPR, whose 
duty is to elect the president, recognized the 
representatives of different social groups. In this 
regard, Megawati was not able to convince the 
majority members of MPR to choose her to hold 
the office of president so that she was overrun by 
Wahid, another candidate for president. Wahid 
was an alternative candidate to the modernist 
Muslims who had supported President B.J. 
Habibie to rule Indonesia for the next five years. 
President Habibie did not continue his ambition 
of becoming the presidential candidate following 
his failure to obtain approval for his presidential 
report by MPR. President Habibie also had been 
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portrayed by his opponents as the right hand of 
the authoritarian Soeharto so that some Muslims 
considered it was not good to support the B.J. 
Habibie as president candidate. His electability 
also decreased significantly with the separation 
of East Timor from Indonesia. Accordingly, 
Wahid was the best choice for the major members 
of MPR to moderate the conflict between the 
supporters of Megawati and those of President 
B.J. Habibie. On the next day, Wahid’s party PKB 
persuaded other parties to choose Megawati as 
the vice-president with the purpose of avoiding 
an outbreak of anarchy by Megawati’s followers, 
as further violence would be detrimental to the 
prospect of democracy in Indonesia. It was likely 
that Megawati would lose in the vote for vice-
president as her party failed to make alliances 
with other parties.
C.2. Abdurrahman Wahid’s Presidential Office 
as a Tool for Consolidating Democracy 
The willingness of Wahid to be president 
candidate was related to his concern about 
resurging sectarian politics (Muhaimin Iskandar, 
2004: 3) and Wahid did not want to see the 
destruction of the Republic of Indonesian 
because of ideological conflicts (Sinta Nuriyah 
Rahman, 2000: 298-299). Upon the amendment 
of the Constitution of 1945 by the Special 
Session of MPR, there arose ideological debates 
in newspaper about the relationship between 
religion, especially Islam, and state. At that 
time, Wahid was very busy with his political 
manoeuvres related to his presidential candidacy 
and his followers responded to this issue, the 
new generation of NU, such as Rumadi. This 
polemic started with the article in Kompas 
titled “Status Quo atau Politik Sekuler” (Status 
Quo or the Secular Politic) written by Denny 
J.A. of the camp of the secular paradigm. This 
article was responded by H.A. Sumargono, the 
follower of Natsir, who wrote an article titled 
“Isu Agama dan Sekulerisme Politik” (Religious 
Issue and the Secular Politic). The main issue of 
the polemic was, in essence, still the same with 
that of Soekarno and Natsir; the only differences 
were related to the facts used to support their 
arguments (Suhelmi, 1999: 123-4). 
The fact of Wahid’s upbringing in the Islamic 
tradition and of his being well versed in modern 
thought contributed to his role of mediating the 
interest of the secularists and that of the Islamists. 
In this regard, Wahid offered the Fiqh-plus 
paradigm to solve the tension between secularists 
and Islamists, as this paradigm recognizes both 
the concept of secular state and Islam as the 
source of values. In so doing, the secular state 
was not detrimental to the development of 
religion, especially Islam, but to what extent was 
this model useful for unifying Muslims to build a 
modern Indonesian state? Indeed, Muslims were 
divided into three different paradigms that were 
the secular, the Islamic ideological, and the Fiqh 
paradigms. However, this paper will focus on 
the response of the Fiqh paradigm to the Islamic 
ideological paradigm, as the secular paradigm 
was not able to develop solid arguments to 
counter the issues developed by the Islamists. 
Most Muslims accepted Pancasila as the 
foundation of the state, but some of them tried to 
interpret Pancasila with Shari’a. We can call the 
latter the supporters of Islamic ideology and those 
who did not want to do so were the supporters of 
the Fiqh paradigm, concerned with the cultural 
approach of Islam. In this regard, although 
President Habibie had a strong connection with 
the late Soeharto because both were tied to the 
national ideology of Pancasila, he, as the leader 
of ICMI, experienced a strong opposition from 
the followers of the secular paradigm. Indeed, he 
represented the interest from the supporters of 
ideological Islam which tried to use the state to 
support the cause of Islam. On other hand, Wahid 
tried to interpret Pancasila based on the theory of 
the secular state which recognizes the separation 
between religious affairs and political affairs. In 
this regard, he supported Soeharto’s legacy of 
de-ideologization (Abdurrahman Wahid, 1997b: 
71-72).
In fact the trend of political Islam in the form of 
the dominant role of Islam in the public sphere 
continued increasing. Its supporters persisted 
in seeing Pancasila as an open ideology which 
should be filled with Shari’a, so they struggled 
to reinstall the seven words of Jakarta Charter 
in the next amendment of the Constitution. This 
became the agendas of the Islamic parties, PPP 
(Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, the United 
Development Party) and PBB (Partai Bulan 
Bintang, the Crescent and Star Party), in the 
Special Session within the Annual Assembly of 
MPR in August 2000. In this regard, the Islamic 
party PK (Partai Keadilan, Justice Party) did not 
propose this agenda just for tactical purposes as 
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it did not pass the electoral threshold. I feel sure 
that PK would have the same mission with other 
Islamic parties of implementing Shari’a if it had 
strong voices in parliament. By so doing, PK 
tried to build a party with the positive image of 
an open party of youth Muslims with the slogans 
of being professional, clean and free from 
corruption, and dedicated to good government. 
Indeed, the majority of parliament members 
refused the inclusion of the seven words which 
would open the possibility for the politicization 
of religion by the ruling party. Of course, this 
inclusion of these seven words violated the 
principle of democracy which recognizes the 
rights of all citizens of having equality before 
the law. Wahid believed that individual devotion 
to the religion was an individual right free from 
any intervention, including the state. Once the 
state intervenes into this private matter, people 
lose their independence in the most personal 
dimension of life. On other hand, this may direct 
towards the sacralisation of politics. 
The drive of Islamic ideology was still strong, 
such as manifest in parliament’s decisions at 
its special assembly on 10-13 November 1999 
which enabled holding a referendum to replace 
the national ideology of Pancasila as well as to 
put an end to the policy of Pancasila becoming 
the only organisational foundation for political 
parties and mass organisations. In this regard, 
Wahid considered that the office of president 
was very important to uphold the Constitution of 
1945 and Pancasila as the foundation for building 
democratic state. He viewed his presidential post 
as a tool for realizing the goal of establishing a 
democratic state. For that purpose, he believed 
that Pancasila should be interpreted following 
the theory of secularization in the view of the 
Fiqh paradigm. By so doing he tried to moderate 
the ideological tension between those who aspire 
to the secular paradigm and those to the Islamic 
ideology paradigm (Rochmat, 2014: 310-11). 
As soon as he was elected as the president, in the 
celebration of Nuzulul Qur’an in Istiqlal mosque 
in Jakarta in 24 December 1999, Wahid stated 
that the government did not want to monopolize 
the definition of religion, and on the other hand, 
no religion had the right to monopolize the course 
of the government. The follow up of this speech 
was the issuance of President Decree Number 
6 Year 2000 in 19 January 2000 to stop the 
effect of President Order Number 14 Year 1967 
which mentions only 5 religions recognized by 
the government. Of course, the Islamic radical 
groups protested about this President Decree 
(Muhamin Iskandar, 2004: 163). 
It was likely that President Wahid did not want 
to follow the Central Axis’s political agendas 
and just committed to the Constitution and 
Pancasila. Three days following his appointment 
of president at the event of “Indonesia Next” 
in Jimbaran, Bali, he expressed his intention 
of opening a trade relationship with Israel 
(Muhaimin Iskandar, 2004: 14-17). Moreover, 
on 29 March 2000 at the 19th graduation and 
anniversary ceremony of Islamic University of 
Malang (Universitas Islam Malang, Unisma) he 
also expressed his idea of the annulations of Tap 
MPRS Number XXV Year 1966 which banned 
Communism. However, this regulation had 
been used by the Seoharto regime to execute, 
improperly, political exclusion of the members 
and followers of Indonesian Communist Party 
(PKI) as well as their families, so as to void of 
their rights to being civil servants (Muhaimin 
Iskandar, 2004: 32-37). By doing so, Wahid did 
not have opportunities to socialize the Fiqh-plus 
paradigm to other Muslims outside of NU as he 
attracted strong attacks from those who aspired 
for the dominant role of Islam in public life. 
The first shot at Wahid was their accusation that 
Wahid did not want to help the Muslims being 
attacked by Christians in Ambon, Tobelo, Buru, 
Ternate and Tidore. In Parliament, Islamists 
coordinated their effort through the caucus of 
the Central Axis which formerly supported 
Wahid as the president and they also held some 
demonstrations (Muhaimin Iskandar, 2004: 123). 
 
C.3. President Wahid’s Further 
Efforts to Consolidate the 
Indonesian Transition to Democracy. 
C.3.a. Supporting Civil Society
President Wahid wanted to develop civil society 
as the consequence of his advocacy of the Fiqh 
paradigm that does not want to set Islam as 
political ideology, but is just concerned with a 
democratic state. The consolidation of democracy 
required a strong support of civil society. In line 
with this, he tried to create a political balance 
between the state and society. For that purpose, 
he dissolved the ministries of social affairs and 
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information. It was not due to the previous 
malpractice of these two departments, but also 
reflected the direction of the future relationship 
between the state and society which would 
reduce the role of the state and enlarge the role 
of society. Wahid convinced that social and 
information affairs should be handled by society 
in the pursuance of a strong civil society. Up 
to that time, the existence of the department of 
social affairs had caused people to be dependent 
on the government and accordingly, it halted the 
empowerment of society. Wahid evaluated that 
the state should not intervene in people’ societal 
affairs and should limit its role to just being a 
facilitator. Accordingly, society should handle 
social affairs themselves in order to play the role 
of civil society (Muhaimin Iskandar, 2004: 8-9). 
Wahid dissolved the department of information 
with the aim of developing democratic 
tradition, namely a free public sphere, such as 
by institutionalizing free mass media. During 
Soeharto regime, this department represented 
an apparatus of the state to maintain the status 
quo. It had censored, controlled, and intimidated 
mass media for the purpose of fulfilling the 
interest of the government. It also functioned 
as “moral watch dog” which defines what 
kind of information morally acceptable by the 
government (Muhaimin Iskandar, 2004: 10). It 
was not easy for Gus Dur to execute this policy 
as some politicians in the parliament opposed 
this idea as being a premature policy. Indeed, 
it was not popular policy in the short term, but 
in the long run, it is useful for the development 
of civil society. Wahid aspired to the idea that 
the mass media could have the role of educating 
people.   
In the regard of dissolvent of the departments 
of information and of social, I evaluate that 
President Wahid was very obsessed by his ideas 
of the separation between state and civil society. 
He did not calculate the political danger for 
dissolving both departments. These policies will 
enable both the upper and lower ranks of civil 
services to unify challenging his presidential 
office. I would advice that he resisted his 
willingness of dissolving these two departments 
and, on other side, he just needed to replace 
the upper rank of the civil services with the 
new ones. The dissolvent of two departments 
had become political turbulences which had 
fastened his downfall from presidential office. 
C.3.b. Establishing Civil Supremacy
President Wahid tried to consolidate democracy 
by continuing the previous government’s policy 
of civil supremacy, where the military institution 
is not allowed to be involved in political affairs. 
This policy was introduced, firstly, by President 
B.J. Habibie, following the fall of the Soeharto 
military regime. For that purpose, following 
liberal democracy, President B.J. Habibie 
separated the ministry of defence and security 
from the military institution under a commander 
in chief and he appointed a civilian, Prof Yuwono 
Sudarsono, to occupy the office of the ministry. 
Then, President Wahid replaced Prof Juwono 
Sudarsono with Prof Mahfud MD, and he gave 
him a task of preparing the draft of the Defence 
Act to replace the existing Act of 20, 1982 
(Muhaimin Iskandar, 2004: 50-52). The concept 
of civil supremacy is to create professionalism 
both in the governmental system and the military 
institution. Accordingly, the military should be 
separated from the police, in which the former 
is dealing with security in terms of military and 
the latter is dealing with security in civil affairs. 
During the new order era, the police did not 
perform as a partners of the people in handling 
security in civil affairs because its actions were 
more militaristic (Muhaimin Iskandar, 2004: 47).
Another policy pursued by President Wahid 
to consolidate the civil supremacy was to 
dissolve Lembaga Penelitian Khusus (Special 
Investigation/ Litsus) and Badan Koordinasi 
Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional 
(Coordinating Agency for National Stability/ 
Bakorstanas), established by the Soeharto 
regime in 1990 and 1998 respectively. This 
policy was issued by President Decree No. 
38/2000 which annulled President Decree No. 
29/1998 on Bakorstanas and President Decree 
No. 16/1990 on Litsus. This policy was to treat 
the military professionally as well as to dismantle 
the repressive system which controlled the 
individual freedom. It was worth mentioning 
that Bakorstanas was a continuing institution 
of Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan 
dan Ketertiban (Operational Command for the 
Restoration of Security and Order/ Kopkamtib) 
which was under the leadership of General 
Soedomo. In this regard, Soedomo agreed 
with the idea of dissolving Bakorstanas as he 
considered it had departed from the original 
intention of Kopkamtib. During the reign of 
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Soeharto, these two institutions were used to 
silence people’s criticism of the regime and their 
bureaucracy spread down to the district level. 
Last but not least, the control of the individual 
freedom also reached the village level as military 
personnel established Bintara Pembina Desa 
(village supervisory non-commissioned officers/ 
Babinsa) which recruited its members from the 
people (Muhaimin Iskandar, 2004: 42-43). 
These two institutions played an important 
role of identifying all non-government powers 
considered as challenging the regime and they 
spied on all activities of the people. Moreover, 
police also participated in this autocratic regime as 
they required people to get their permission in the 
case of gathering people, not related to the issue 
of security protection, but to silence the people. 
These two institutions were in charge of the 
arrest of pro-democracy activists by discrediting 
them: as left extremists for the followers of 
socialism and Marxism; as right extremists for 
the followers of religious aspirations, especially 
Islamic ones. Accordingly, dismantling these two 
institutions was to establish the supremacy of 
law which requires the court mechanism to judge 
people as being guilty or not guilty (Muhaimin 
Iskandar, 2004: 42-45).  
President Wahid considered the civil supremacy 
was not a kind of domination of civil over military 
as a personal member of the army was eligible to 
participate in political affairs, with the condition 
of leaving his/her military status; besides he/she 
should pursue his/her political interest through a 
democratic mechanism. Indeed, it was not easy 
for him to implement this idea of civil supremacy 
as the military had strong political power as it 
controlled the strategic civil positions. Moreover, 
the civil power, especially the politicians, did 
not have a common platform useful to limit the 
involvement of the military in politics. It was so 
naive that some politicians asked for the help 
of the military to support their narrow minded 
political agendas and accordingly, the military 
made use of this civil political fragmentation 
to regain its military influence (Muhaimin 
Iskandar, 2004: 31). Some politicians of the 
caucus of the Central Axis cooperated with the 
military to remove Wahid from his presidential 
office. Accordingly, President Wahid failed to 
put the general in chief under the control of the 
minister of defence and security (Muhaimin 
Iskandar, 2004: 52). Indeed, the military still 
had real political power so that it could play a 
crucial role behind the political manoeuvres of 
the Central Axis (Ahmad Suaedy, 2010: xvii). 
The political influence of the military manifested 
clearly in Tap MPR Number VI and VII Year 
2000 which recognizes a general in chief and the 
head of police as having equivalent rank to the 
ministry. These Taps blocked President Wahid’s 
effort of positioning the military and the police 
under civil control (Mahfud MD, 2010: 17). 
C.3.c. Establishing Law Enforcement
It is law enforcement which would support the 
establishment of democracy as it would provide 
justice and welfare to people. Injustice and social 
disparities happen because law enforcement 
does not run properly, which implies democracy 
does not prevail. Therefore, President Wahid 
employed some strategies to improve the service 
as well as the protection of law for the people. 
For that purpose, he established the National 
Law Commission (Komisi Hukum Nasional, 
KHN) on February 18, 2000 in the form of the 
Presidential Regulation No. 15 Year 2000 with 
the aim of preparing the daft on law reformation 
favourable to the law supremacy and human 
rights. For this, he appointed Prof J.E. Sahetapy, 
who, firstly, would like to reform the bureaucracy 
of the law institutions (Muhaimin Iskandar, 
2004: 57). 
President Wahid also established another 
institution for establishing law enforcement, 
namely the National Commission of Ombudsmen 
(Komisi Ombudsman Nasional), on March 20, 
2000 by the Presidential Decree No. 44 Year 2000, 
and appointed Anton Sujata SH as its head officer. 
This institution was to endorse law enforcement 
which did not run smoothly, so that it was not 
overlapping with the existing law institutions. 
This is due to this institution not dealing with 
the technical procedures, just concerned with 
the people’s complaints, however, having rights 
of having clarification from the government and 
judicial institutions apparatus. The focus of this 
institution is the institutions of police, judicial 
affairs, and public prosecutor. Wahid endorsed 
the people to monitor the implementation of the 
law enforcement which constitutes an important 
part of the implementation of democracy. 
Hopefully this would minimize misuses of power 
and authority by the state apparatus (Muhaimin 
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Iskandar, 2004: 55-58).
President Wahid had planned to create a 
Constitution Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi, 
MK), but his plan did not materialize as he 
was removed from his presidency. This plan is 
implicitly expressed in his article below:   
“Accordingly, it is unconstitutional for 
the state apparatus to violate law or 
neglect the people’s rights by means of 
the officer’s regulation or the series of 
the constitutional regulations. However, 
what institution would evaluation 
the validity of decree, policy, and 
regulation?” (Syaiful Arif, 2009: 269).
4. Conclusion
Abdurrahman Wahid became the President of the 
Republic of Indonesia because of his inspiring 
ideas of democracy, not the support of his 
political party PKB (the Awakening Party of the 
Nation). These ideas of democracy were able to 
mediate the tension between the two opposing 
groups, namely the nationalist groups and the 
Islamist groups (Poros Tengah, the Central Axis). 
It was due to his ideas of democracy already 
adapted to the Islamic tradition and he himself 
also came from Islamic group, namely Nahdlatul 
Ulama. Indeed, he already tried to unify the 
modern system of knowledge to the Islamic one 
by employing the fiqh-plus paradigm. In doing 
so, he did not develop a legal formal approach to 
the relationship between Islam and the state, but 
pursued a political approach, enabling Muslim to 
participate fully in the national political system. 
By so doing, Muslim just concern with the 
universal values such as democracy, toleration, 
justice, freedom, and equality by the law, so 
that they are able to develop cooperation with 
the followers of other religions. In line with 
this, religious groups play a role of civil society, 
which would provide checks and balances to the 
state, as the requirement for the development of 
democracy.
 Abdurrahman Wahid made uses of his 
presidential office to consolidate the transition 
of democracy from the Soeharto authoritarian 
regime. He had done some big efforts, such as 
by supporting civil society, establishing civil 
supremacy, and law enforcement. For that 
purposes, he was very brave to gambling with 
his office of President as he did not have enough 
political support from his party PKB. In doing 
so, he got some challenges from some groups, 
previously supporting him to be President. First, 
he got strong challenges from the Central Axis, 
the main group contribute to his winning of the 
presidential election. He did not want to give some 
privileges to them as these would contravene the 
principles of democracy. Secondly, his efforts of 
establishing civil supremacy radically got strong 
challenges from the elites of the military. Last but 
not the least, he was also challenged by his rival at 
the presidential election, namely vice-President 
Megawati Soekarno Puteri of the nationalist group 
PDI-P who still had ambition to be President. 
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